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CONSTITUTIONALISM, GOOD FAITH
AND THE DOCTRINE OF SPECIFIC
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This article will explore the European roots of the doctrine of specific performance and the
influence of transformative constitutionalism on these in recent times. The question
whether specific performance is available as of right (as in the civil law), or only subject to
judicial discretion (as in the common law), will be investigated. The demonstrated impact
of constitutional rights on contract law in the mixed system of South Africa will be
contrasted with developments in English and Australian contract law, where the
common-law rules are more deeply entrenched and the potential scope for human
rights-based development of these is arguably smaller, though still important. The article
will argue, using comparative rules on specific performance as an example, that the concept
of a duty of good faith or contractual fairness is likely to play a greater role in future in all
three of the countries under consideration, reducing the common/civil/mixed legal systems
divide.
I INTRODUCTION
The interplay between constitutional law and contract law presents a
fascinating study in judicial ‘modernising’ of law, and its efforts to transform
society into a more just and caring construct. These developments have
counterparts in leading Western legal systems around the world.1 Of course,
notions of good faith or equity are nothing new in contract law and are
inherent in the notion of justice.2 ‘Fairness’, or ‘good faith’ has a role to play
at the remedial stage of contracting as well. Indeed, the link between good
faith and specific performance has been explored by others, with regard to
* LLB PhD (Turin).
† BA LLB LLM PhD (UCT).
1 The impact of human rights law on common-law systems, particularly English
and Australian law, will be considered below in part III. There will also be a brief
analysis of the mixed South African jurisdiction in that part. For a more general
survey, which includes civil law countries, see Chantal Mak Fundamental Rights in
European Contract Law: A Comparison of the Impact of Fundamental Rights on Contractual
Relationships in Germany, the Netherlands, Italy and England (2008); Stefan Grundmann
Constitutional Values and European Contract Law (2008).
2 A good comparative survey of the historical development of contractual good
faith in both the common and civil law is given in Simon Whittaker & Reinhard
Zimmermann ‘Good faith in European contract law: Surveying the legal landscape’
in Reinhard Zimmermann & Simon Whittaker (eds) Good Faith in European Contract
Law (2000) 7.
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both the civil and common law,3 as well as with reference to the ‘mixed’
South African jurisdiction.4
The primary focus of this article will be on the doctrine of specific
performance, focusing on the development of this remedy in the English
common law, as well as in two systems which have been influenced by the
English conception of the doctrine, namely Australian law and, more
tenuously, South African law.5 This three-way study was chosen due to the
fact not only that it highlights from an historical point of view the
connections between the laws of contract of these three distinct jurisdictions,
but also because it emphasises the current divergences between these systems,
based on the rise to prominence of differing human rights (‘HR’) regimes in
all three countries. This means that these various laws of contract must now
be reinterpreted in the light of HR, or at least, that this is the case in South
Africa and the United Kingdom.6 Australia, as shall be demonstrated below,
has no justiciable Bill of Rights, yet it is developing its own particular brand
of HR-inspired contract law.7
The problem with the laws of all three countries in question is that there is
only a very limited role played by open norms such as good faith, and which
can be used to transform contract law to reflect constitutional values. These
open norms place duties on contracting parties to ensure a certain level of
respect for the legitimate interests of one’s opposing contracting party, as well
as providing an avenue for the modernisation and development of contract
law to reflect current needs.8 In the English common law good faith plays a
minimal role in contract law, relegated largely to specific forms of contract,
3 See for example Daniel Friedmann ‘Good faith and remedies for breach of
contract’ in Jack Beatson & Daniel Friedmann (eds) Good Faith and Fault in Contract
Law (1995) 399. G H Treitel Remedies for Breach of Contract: A Comparative Account
(1988) notes at 47 with regard to both common- and civil-law systems that specific
enforcement may be limited as a remedy where it would impact on the personal
freedom of the debtor, or cause undue hardship to him in a way that an award of
damages would not, particularly if the mitigation rule were to be applied. See also ibid
at 66.
4 Gerhard Lubbe ‘Contractual derogation and the discretion to refuse an order for
specific performance’ in Graham Glover (ed) Essays in Honour of AJ Kerr (2006) 77.
5 See the discussion of the development of the doctrine of specific performance in
part II below.
6 Section 2 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, states that
‘[t]he Constitution is the supreme law of the Republic’. See further for the impact of
the Bill of Rights on the South African law of contract: Iain Currie & Johan de Waal
The Bill of Rights Handbook 6 ed (2013) 60–3. The United Kingdom remains a parlia-
mentary sovereign state and the Human Rights Act, 1998 has only the status of
ordinary legislation, yet there is an emerging body of case law reinterpreting English
contract law in the light of human rights. See generally Mak op cit note 1 at 22–5 and
135–43.
7 See part III below.
8 See generally Whittaker & Zimmermann op cit note 2.
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such as insurance.9 Australia seems to be diverging from this starting point,
although in a guarded and incremental fashion.10 In South Africa, the status
of good faith as an independent doctrine which could be relied upon
independently to challenge a contract has long been contested.11 The
Appellate Division and its successor, the Supreme Court of Appeal, cut short
the development of a duty of good faith in contract from 1988 onwards,12
although since 2007 the now apex Constitutional Court has been eroding
this position, leaving the exact present status of the duty uncertain, due to the
fact that South African contract law is evidently in a transitional phase.13
Historically in English, Australian and South African law, specific perfor-
mance has been a way of achieving contractual fairness (or one might say
good faith) at the remedial phase of contracting, in the absence of an
enforceable duty of good faith. This argument is developed in part II below.
In the South African context, Lubbe drew attention to this peculiar feature of
the law of contract in 2006:
‘[T]here is a basis for the view that the judicial discretion in this regard [specific
performance] is in conflict with the denial by the courts of a judicial power to
derogate from the consequences of contracts on the grounds of reasonableness
and fairness. To restrict the discretion to the remedial sphere might offer a way
out of this dilemma, but is in itself problematic in a number of ways. . . . The
denial of an order for specific performance on account of considerations of
public policy, uncertainty or impossibility is, in the final analysis, as much an
expression of the interplay between abstract considerations of reasonableness,
fairness and other policy considerations as a finding that an agreement tested
9 Ibid at 39–48. See further Roger Brownsword ‘Positive, negative, neutral: The
reception of good faith in English contract law’ in Roger Brownsword, Norma J Hird
& Geraint Howells (eds) Good Faith in Contract — Concept and Context (1999) 13;
Günther Teubner ‘Legal irritants: Good faith in British law or how unifying law ends
up in new divergences’ (1998) 61 MLR 11.
10 See Vodafone Pacific Ltd v Mobile Innovations Ltd [2004] NSWCA15 paras 125 and
189. See further Alcatel Australia Ltd v Scarcella (1998) 44 NSWLR 349 and Burger
King Corporation v Hungry Jack’s Pty Ltd (2001) 69 NSWLR 558 in support of this
view. The question whether a duty of good faith should be recognised in the perfor-
mance of all contracts had previously been left open by the High Court of Australia in
Royal Botanic Gardens v South Sydney City Council (2002) 186 ALR 289. See also notes
139, 140 and 141 below.
11 See generally Reinhard Zimmermann ‘Good faith and equity’ in Reinhard
Zimmermann & Daniel Visser (eds) Southern Cross: Civil Law and Common Law in
South Africa (1996) 217; Dale Hutchison ‘Good faith in the South African law of
contract’ in Brownsword, Hird & Howells (eds) op cit note 9 at 213.
12 Bank of Lisbon & South Africa Ltd v De Ornelas 1988 (3) SA 580 (A) at 607A–B;
Brisley v Drotsky 2002 (4) SA 1 (SCA) para 22; Afrox Healthcare Bpk v Strydom 2002 (6)
SA 21 (SCA) paras 31–2; South African Forestry Co Ltd v York Timbers Ltd 2005 (3) SA
323 (SCA) para 27.
13 Barkhuizen v Napier 2007 (5) SA 323 (CC); Everfresh Market Virginia (Pty) Ltd v
Shoprite Checkers (Pty) Ltd 2012 (1) SA256 (CC); Maphango v Aengus Lifestyle Properties
(Pty) Ltd 2012 (3) SA 531 (CC); Botha v Rich NO 2014 (4) SA 124 (CC); Cool Ideas
1186 CC v Hubbard 2014 (4) SA474 (CC); Malan v City of Cape Town 2014 (6) SA315
(CC).
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against the doctrines of substantive legal doctrine does not qualify as a
contract.’14
The argument which this article will advance is that a ‘constitutional
analysis’ of contract law must focus on values such as reasonableness, fairness
and possibly even good faith. The focus here will be on the doctrine of
specific performance in particular: this article will examine this remedy in the
laws of England, Australia and South Africa in the light of constitutional
values of contractual fairness in order to determine the validity of Lubbe’s
arguments above. We shall evaluate whether the doctrine of specific
performance, as found in the three countries studied, is undergoing some
transformation in the light of supervening HR regimes. This will be
presented in part III, which will reflect on the living nature of this doctrine
and the evolution which is occurring in the three systems under examina-
tion. By comparing these three legal systems, we hope to shed light on the
impact of constitutional law on contract law, using specific performance as a
case study. In part II below, we consider the philosophical reasoning
underlying the concept of specific performance, which necessitates a brief
overview of its origins by way of contextualisation.
II A HISTORICAL AND PHILOSOPHICAL UNDERSTANDING
OF SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE
(a) Common-law and civil-law doctrines of specific performance
Specific performance is considered to be an exceptional remedy in common-
law countries.15 In particular, as will be discussed in due course,16 in English
law specific performance is, along with injunction,17 an equitable remedy
granted only when the common-law remedy of damages would be inade-
quate, and if other specific requirements are satisfied. In addition, the courts
have discretion to consider other factors whilst deciding whether or not to
order a breaching party to perform.
This approach stands in opposition to that followed within the civil-law
tradition, where specific performance plays, at least in theory, a prominent
role.18
14 Lubbe op cit note 4 at 99.
15 In this article when we refer to ‘the common law’ we refer to a legal tradition
adopted mostly in former English colonies, and which is marked by a number of
particular characteristics, mostly derived from English law. We do not refer in this
article to the ‘common law’ in its distinctive South African meaning: ie as being a
sub-set of South African law which includes elements of both case law and customary
law, but which is distinct from legislation or executive regulation.
16 See part III below.
17 In SouthAfrica we would say an ‘interdict’.
18 For an introduction on the origins, essence, and relevance of the common/
civil-law divide, see Alan Watson Roman Law and Comparative Law (1991); Konrad
Zweigert & Hein Kötz An Introduction to Comparative Law 3 ed (tr Tony Weir 1998)
63–275; Harold Gutteridge Comparative Law: An Introduction to the Comparative
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Historically, common-law courts had refused to award specific perfor-
mance since the end of the twelfth century.19 To provide for a measure of
justice, the courts of equity, given their aim to redress various inadequacies of
the common-law judicial system, have instead developed several remedies
that were described as equitable.20 Any litigant who had reasons to feel
unsatisfied with the common-law courts’ judgment was allowed to petition
the King himself through the Chancellor. With time, the petitions came to
be addressed only to the Chancellor until a separated court, namely the
Court of Chancery, was created in the thirteen century with the specific task
of dealing with these sorts of claims. The rule was, at least in its early years,
that the court had power to resolve disputes according to the internal conscience
of the Chancellors to rectify defects in the common law. This is the reason
why it is usually said that equity, as a separate jurisdiction, acted (and still acts)
in personam.21
This area of law represents one of the best examples of how morality enters
legal discourse and influences law’s performative instances,22 as is demon-
strated by the fact that in the modern law, equitable remedies still contain a
certain degree of discretion, while in the past the courts of equity used their
discretionary power more freely. Yet this has inevitably affected both the
predictability and certainty of the system of equity and ultimately led Lord
Method of Legal Study and Research (1949); Otto Kahn Freund Comparative Law as an
Academic Subject (1965); Basil S Markesinis Comparative Law in the Courtroom and Class-
room (2003); Peter de Cruz Comparative Law in a Changing World (2007); H Patrick
Glenn Legal Traditions of the World (2010) 133–80 and 237–87; Tom Ginsburg, Pier
Giuseppe Monateri, Francesco Parisi Classics in Comparative Law (2014); Luca
Siliquini-Cinelli ‘Taking (legal) traditions seriously, or why Australian contract law
should not be codified:An unconventional inquiry’ (2015) 34 University of Queensland
Law Journal 99.
19 John P Dawson ‘Specific performance in France and Germany’ (1959) 57 Michi-
gan LR 457.
20 See Raul C van Caenegem Judges, Legislators and Professors. Chapters in European
and Legal History (1988); Paul Brand The Making of the Common Law (1992); Paul
Brand Kings, Barons and Justices. The Making and Enforcement of Legislation in Thirteenth-
Century England (2003). Also, see Lord Ellesmere’s definition of the common law as
quoted in Origines Juridicales or Historical Memorials of the English Laws, Courts of Justice,
Forms of Trial, Punishments in Cases Criminal, Law Writers, Law Books, Grants and
Settlements of Estates, Degree of Serjeant, Innes of Courts and Chancery 2 ed (1671–1680);
John H Baker An Introduction to English Legal History 4 ed (2002); Robert Meagher,
James Dyson Heydon, Mark J Leeming Meagher Gummow & Lehane’s Equity: Doctrines
& Remedies 4 ed (2002); Zweigert & Kötz op cit note 18 at 206-12.
21 The ad personam label is indicative not of the fact that equity arises from the
Chancellor’s discretionary will as a single judging authority, rather than from the legal
system as a whole, but that the equitable remedy is directed against the person rather
than the right at the centre of the dispute.
22 Describing the relationship equity-contract law, Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr
once said ‘[n]owhere is the confusion between legal and moral ideas more manifest
that in the law of contract’. See The Path of the Law ([1897] 2011) 7. See also John
Cartwright Contract Law. An Introduction to the English Law of Contract for the Civil
Lawyer 2 ed (2013) 5–8.
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Eldon, the then Lord Chancellor, to call in 1818 for a more coherent method
of decision-making.23
In 1873, the Judicature Act24 abolished the Court of Chancery and
established the Supreme Court of Judicature, a single Court of Appeal and a
single High Court of Justice in which all judges ‘could and should apply all
the relevant rules of law’.25 The Supreme Court of Judicature acts as
common law and equity court (giving, however, priority to equity in case of
conflict between the two). Despite what was argued by Ashburner, it is
reasonable to say that these two streams of substantive and adjectival
jurisdiction ‘mingle their waters’.26 Importantly, as we will see in part III,
these judiciary reforms were followed in the Australian colonies as well, and
the supreme courts in that country were granted the jurisdictional authority
to deal with both common-law and equity cases.
That said, the exceptional essence of equitable remedies, and thus of
specific performance, cannot merely be explained through the reference to
the common lawyer’s preference for the (relative) simplicity of damages
awards. It is worth mentioning that, while civil-law systems focus more on
the promise implied in a contractual relationship, English law is more
concerned with the economic side of the breach of contract, which is
understood in terms of a wrong primarily to be punished by damages.27
Although, according to Gaius’s Institutiones, praetorian civil actions ended
in money judgments,28 the Corpus Juris Civilis opted for a clear-cut distinc-
tion between different types of obligations. Only for the so-called obligations
dandi (to give), which concerned the transfer of ownership and which were
easily enforceable, did the court grant the remedy of specific performance.
This applied for the obligations restituendi as well whereas, in cases
concerning an obligation faciendi (to do or not to do) the court was under
23 Gee v Pritchard (1818) 2 Swans 402, 414; 36 ER 670, 674. Whilst describing the
‘technique of equity’, Ian Spry points out that ‘equitable principles [. . .] are of great
width and elasticity’. See The Principles of Equitable Remedies 10 ed (2010) 1.
24 Now Senior CourtsAct, 1981 (formerly Supreme CourtAct, 1981).
25 Cartwright op cit note 22 at 7.
26 Quoted, and challenged, by Lord Diplock in United Scientific Holdings Ltd v
Burnley BC [1978] 1AC 904 at 924.
27 Martin Hogg Promises and Contract Law. Comparative Perspectives (2011). See fur-
ther Reinhard Zimmermann The Law of Obligations: Roman Foundations of the Civilian
Tradition (1990) who notes at 776–9 that the reason for this attitude lies in the histori-
cal origins of modern English contract law in the action of assumpsit, which was
essentially an early delictual remedy allowing a plaintiff to claim compensation for
wrong done under a ‘transaction’ based on agreement. Actions for assumpsit could be
remedied only by a payment of damages.
28 Institutiones IV 48. For an overview of Gaius’s role in the development of
Roman law and legal reasoning, see Pier Giuseppe Monateri ‘Black Gaius:Aquest for
the multicultural origins of the ‘‘Western legal tradition’’ ’ (2000) 51 Hastings Law
Journal 3; Luca Siliquini-Cinelli ‘Legal systemology and the geopolitics of Roman
law: A response to Stuart Elden’s critique of Carl Schmitt’s spatial ontology’ (2015) 9
Pólemos — Journal of Law, Literature and Culture 411.
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the duty to order the defendant to pay a monetary amount should he be
found liable.29
The French and German jurists of the seventeenth and eighteenth
centuries who delved into this structuralist distinction tried to ascertain
whether the primary effect of contractual agreements was that of binding the
parties to perform their obligation or not. Avowedly, Domat opted for the
former solution, which he promoted through the maxim that agreements
have force of law between the contracting parties.30 Domat was fundamen-
tally inspired by the early modern natural law school, which was ultimately
aimed at promoting the rational (and, hence universal and constructivist31)
understanding of legal rules. The same approach was further maintained,
despite a few slight differences, by Pothier and Bourjon. Hence, articles
1142–1144 of the French Civil code are officially rooted in Pothier’s
accounts of the necessary requirements to coerce somebody to do some-
thing,32 whereas from a substantive point of view articles 1143 and 1144, in
cases of non-performance, resemble more closely Bourjoin’s conception of
remedies, which focused more on the creditor’s satisfaction, rather than on
the debtor’s alternative options to fulfil the obligation.33
The role of specific performance within contract-law theory and practice
divided private legal scholars on the other side of the Rhine as well.34 The
German divide, which lasted until the end of the eighteenth century, helps us
to understand why specific performance is still today theoretically considered
as a right in civil-law systems. Indeed, although the notion that all
(contractual) obligations had to be performed in specie was ultimately rooted
in the early Natural law school, the German Protestant Church of the
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries had a clear role in promoting this view
as well.35 Under the influence of the Church’s ultra-terrain doctrines and
anti-monetary policies, scholars such as Heineccius, Otto and Walch
29 For an introduction, see Dawson op cit note 19; Janwillem Oosterhuis Specific
Performance in German, French and Dutch Law in the Nineteenth Century (2011) 21–7. For
a more theoretical inquiry, see Peter Stein Regulae Iuris: From Juristic Rules to Legal
Maxims (1966).
30 By way of an example, this rule, which is nothing other than a corollary of the
doctrine of the privity of contract, is embodied in the French and Italian Civil codes
(respectively, arts 1134 and 1372).
31 Friedrich Hayek Law, Legislation and Liberty ([1973, 1976, 1979] 2013) 1–165;
Siliquini-Cinelli op cit note 18.
32 Pothier applied the Commentators’ nemo praecise cogi potest ad factum
maxim, according to which no one can be compelled to act, to all obligations to do or
not to do. As a result, he claimed, in these situations damages should always be the
preferred solution.
33 See Oosterhuis op cit note 29 at 62–5. Cf also art 1184 on the role of subsequent
conditions in synallagmatic contracts.
34 Oosterhuis op cit note 29 at 78–84. See also Pier Giuseppe Monateri Contratto e
Trasferimento della Proprietà. I Sistemi Romanisti (2008); Pier Giuseppe Monateri Pensare
il Diritto Civile (2006);Antonio Padoa Schioppa Storia del Diritto in Europa (2007).
35 Harold J Berman Law and Revolution. The Impact of the Protestant Reformations on
Western Legal Tradition ([2003] 2006) 29–130 and 156–75.
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expressly favoured the enforcement of contractual duties and spent great
efforts in claiming that specific performance ought to be the primary (if not
the only) remedy to be given to the creditor. This view was ultimately
embodied in § 241(1) of the Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch (‘BGB’).36
(b) The South African doctrine of specific performance
As a mixed legal system, it is unremarkable that the South African law of
contract would display elements of both common- and civil-law thinking on
specific performance. Since the earliest reported cases in that country, a
plaintiff’s right to this remedy has been recognised.37 The authority given for
this was to be found in the Roman-Dutch sources, which were the official
basis of modern South African contract law. Yet even in these earliest cases,
there was a limit to how far a court would go in awarding specific
performance. In Thompson v Pullinger, Kotzé J, drawing on Roman Dutch
sources, noted that the right of a plaintiff to specific performance ‘is beyond
all doubt’, but qualified this remedy with the statement that where a
substitute performance was ‘daily dealt in on the market’, payment of
compensation would be a ‘full and satisfactory’ remedy.38 This qualification
was described with reference to English authorities.39
After 1910, the Appellate Division confirmed that specific performance
was available as of right.40 Good faith has always been a central underlying
value of South African contract law, arising out of the Roman-Dutch view
that good faith was the basis of consensual contracts.41 Thus there was always
a need for courts to give effect to the equitable requirements of good faith in
deciding contract cases, although this requirement was typically given effect
to through the medium of more specific rules.42 Aneed to ensure that fairness
was achieved in the outcomes of specific cases resulted in recognition of a
rule that an award of an order of specific performance was always subject to
judicial discretion.43 As to guidelines as to how to exercise this discretion, the
citing of English textbooks and cases as persuasive authority, saw a pervasive
36 Cf. also §§ 284, 286, and 326(1) BGB. Similarly, compare also arts 1453 and
2930 of the Italian Civil Code.
37 The first reported instance of specific performance as a remedy in South Africa
appears to be Cohen v Shires, McHattie and King 1882 Kotzé’s R 41 at 45.
38 (1894) 1 OR 298 at 301.
39 Ibid.
40 Farmers’ Co-operative Society v Berry 1912 AD 343 at 350; Woods v Walters 1921
AD 303 at 309–10.
41 For a good historical account of the basis of South African contract law in the
medieval concept of iudicia bona fidei, see for example: Zimmermann op cit note 11;
Hutchison op cit note 11.
42 See the sources cited in notes 12 and 64, especially the finding of the Supreme
Court ofAppeal in Brisley supra note 12 at para 22.
43 The leading cases on the role which discretion plays in an award of specific
performance are Haynes v King William’s Town Municipality 1951 (2) SA 371 (A) and
Benson v SA Mutual Life Assurance Society 1986 (1) SA 776 (A). See further Lubbe op
cit note 4.
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influence of common-law thinking on this topic.44 As Zimmermann notes,
this led to the position that for much of the twentieth century, despite the fact
that specific performance was nominally permitted as of right, the inroads
made into this right by a list of factors guiding judicial discretion were largely
the same as those applied by the English courts.45
These grounds were summarised by the Appellate Division in 1951, in
Haynes v King William’s Town Municipality, which was for many years the
leading case:
‘(a) where damages would adequately compensate the plaintiff; (b) where it
would be difficult for the Court to enforce its decree; (c) where the thing
claimed can readily be bought anywhere; (d) where specific performance
entails the rendering of services of a personal nature. . . (e) where it would
operate unreasonably hardly on the defendant, or where the agreement giving
rise to the claim is unreasonable, or where the decree would produce injustice,
or would be inequitable under all the circumstances.’46
The first four of these grounds stated the previously established general
grounds for refusing specific performance, while the fifth, taken from Wessels
on Contract,47 sums up what might broadly be termed a discretion exercised
on equitable grounds, or that specific performance would not be awarded
where the awarding of this remedy would run counter to good faith.48
Then in 1986, in what is today the leading case on the topic of specific
performance, the Appellate Division undercut much of its earlier concretisa-
tion of the above listed grounds for an exercise of judicial discretion in
response to a request for specific performance. This decision in Benson v SA
Mutual Life Assurance Society49 concerned the question whether or not to
enforce a demand to deliver shares, which could freely be bought elsewhere
on the market and possibly even at a lower price than that stipulated for in the
contract. Hefer JA made three points for a unanimous court:
(1) It was settled law that a grant or refusal of specific performance was at
the court’s discretion;
(2) The plaintiff’s right to delivery of the shares had been factually
established; and
(3) The right to specific performance was a ‘cornerstone’ of South African
law and that there could be no curtailment of the plaintiff’s right to
performance by any rule as to how judicial discretion should be
exercised. Nevertheless, this judicial discretion was not completely
44 See further: Philip Gross ‘Specific performance of contracts in South Africa’
(1934) 51 SALJ 347 at 364–8; A A Roberts (ed) Wessels The Law of Contract in South
Africa 2 ed (1951) 830–4 (‘Wessels’); Andrew Beck ‘The coming of age of specific
performance’ (1987) 30 CILSA 190 at 206.
45 Zimmermann op cit note 27 at 782.
46 Haynes supra note 43 at 378H–379A.
47 Wessels op cit note 44 at 830–4.
48 Beck op cit note 44 at 197–8. Compare the discussion of Treitel op cit note 3 at
47 and 65–6.
49 Supra note 43.
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unfettered but must always be granted and withheld in accordance with
‘legal and public policy’, so that it does not operate unduly harshly on
the defendant. In addition, a court would never order specific perfor-
mance where this was impossible (distinguishing between impossibility
which would extinguish the obligation and absolve liability and the
situation where performance was impossible but the debtor was still
contractually bound).50
The defendant was ordered to deliver the shares to the plaintiff.51 On the
question of the authoritative source of South African law on specific
performance the Appellate Division had the following to say:
‘[W]hereas the substance of the law relating to the specific performance of
contracts was sought and discovered in the Roman-Dutch authorities, English
law became the source of its practical application. Had the two systems of law
been compatible the subject on which they thus became married, there could
have been no objection. But they are not. . . . Despite this distinctly different
approach, rules deriving purely from Chancery practice were applied in South
Africa. . . . Some of our textbook writers, particularly the older ones, naturally
followed suit. . . . [A]nd so it came about that English cases came to be followed
somewhat indiscriminately without noticeable regard to the fundamentally
different approach which the Courts in England adopt when it comes to the
exercise of the discretion to order performance. There is neither need nor
reason for this process to continue.’52
Thus one may read in modern South African contract-law textbooks that
specific performance is the ‘primary’ remedy for breach of contract.53 The
Appellate Division has done away with the previously established English-
law grounds for exercising discretion in this context, subsuming all discre-
tionary considerations under the dual banners of impossibility and policy
considerations (which would include ‘fairness’).54 Commentators have
drawn attention to the inherent tension between balancing a right to specific
performance against the necessity to use discretion in each case to ensure
fairness inter partes.55 Indeed, fairness and a ‘right’ to specific performance
may often cut in opposite directions, particularly where one enters the
difficult realm of constitutional rights. In the next part, this article will
relocate to the contemporary era to consider the potential impact of the
constitutional development of South African contract law on the doctrine of
specific performance as expounded in Benson. In particular, the question will
50 Ibid at 781G–783F (original text paraphrased).
51 Ibid at 785G–H.
52 Ibid at 784I–785E.
53 Dale Hutchison & Chris-James Pretorius The Law of Contract in South Africa 2ed
(2012) 321. Compare R H Christie & G B Bradfield The Law of Contract in South
Africa 6 ed (2011) 545; Louis F van Huyssteen & Catherine J Maxwell Contract Law in
South Africa 3 ed (2014) 183.
54 Benson supra note 43 at 783C–H. Compare Beck op cit note 44 at 201.
55 Alfred Cockrell ‘Breach of contract’ in Zimmermann & Visser (eds) op cit note
11 at 328.
(2016) 133 THE SOUTH AFRICAN LAW JOURNAL82
be posed, with reference to the comparative common law, how a justiciable
Bill of Rights will affect the discretionary grounds on which a judge may
decide whether to award specific performance or not.
III CONSTITUTIONAL LAW AND SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE
(a) South Africa: a new constitutional law of contract and its impact on the remedy of
specific performance
The final South African Constitution came into force on 4 February 1997.56
This instrument contained, for the first time in South African history, a
justiciable Bill of Rights.57 This Bill of Rights has been interpreted by the
Constitutional Court to apply horizontally, albeit indirectly, and hence to
govern transactions between private parties.58 The common law of contract
in South Africa has not been immune from this process: there is no express
constitutional right to freedom of contract, nor indeed to good faith or
fairness in contracting, but the Constitutional Court has been developing a
jurisprudence which seeks to balance these (often competing) values since
the decision in Barkhuizen v Napier in 2007.59 Emerging from this develop-
ment is the obvious conclusion that the Constitutional Court sees fairness as
being an integral component of contracting, which will at times limit a
party’s right to freedom of contract.60 This doctrine of ‘fairness’ has been
developed under various concepts familiar to the South African law of
contract, including public policy and good faith.
Prior to the constitutional development of this aspect of contract law, the
Supreme Court of Appeal had denied a role for an independent doctrine of
good faith in South African contract law, reasoning that good faith was a
doctrine underlying the law, which could find expression in its more specific
rules.61 This line of cases was severely undercut by the decision in Barkhuizen,
56 The interim Constitution had already come into force on 27 April 1994, along
with the introduction of a new democratic era in SouthAfrica.
57 Chapter 2 of the Constitution of the Republic of SouthAfrica, 1996.
58 Currie & De Waal op cit note 6 at 60–3; Carmichele v Minister of Safety and
Security (Centre for Applied Legal Studies Intervening) 2001 (4) SA 938 (CC) at paras
33–60, interpreting the obligation in s 39(2) of the 1996 Constitution to develop the
common law in the light of the Constitution. In a contractual context, see the pas-
sages cited from Barkhuizen supra note 13 below.
59 See Barkhuizen and the other cases cited in note 13 supra.
60 See Barkhuizen ibid para 51; Everfresh supra note 13 para 72; Maphango supra note
13 para 55 (interpreting the requirements of ‘fairness’ as set out in the Rental Housing
Act 50 of 1999); Botha supra note 13 paras 45–6. For further discussion of fettering
of contractual powers based on a constitutional duty of reasonableness, see Alistair
Price & Andrew Hutchison ‘Judicial review of exercises of contractual power: South
Africa’s divergence from the common law tradition’ (2015) 79 Rabels Zeitschrift für
ausländisches und internationales Privatrecht 768.
61 Bank of Lisbon supra note 12 at 607A–B; Brisley supra note 12 para 22; Afrox
supra note 12 paras 31–2; SAFCOL v York Timbers supra note 12 para 27; Bredenkamp
v Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd 2010 (4) SA468 (SCA) paras 50–1.
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and the Constitutional Court has gone on to reinforce and clarify its
reasoning in that case in several later decisions.62 Whether the Constitutional
Court will develop the South African doctrine of ‘fairness’ into something
akin to the open norm of good faith, whether as capable of founding a cause
of action independently, or as a term implied by law in all contracts, remains
to be seen. South African contract law is in a state of flux and there are at
present too few decisions to give full content to the doctrine. Thus the
possible limitations which constitutional law will in time place upon the law
of contract is open to speculation. What we can assert with confidence at this
stage, however, is that the Constitution is relevant at all stages of contracting,
from negotiation to conclusion to performance and, if necessary, enforce-
ment.
The first concept which requires unpacking is ‘indirect horizontality’: in
Barkhuizen, the Constitutional Court held as follows:
‘Ordinarily constitutional challenges to contractual terms will give rise to the
question of whether the disputed provision is contrary to public policy. . . .
What public policy is and whether a term in a contract is contrary to public
policy must now be determined by reference to the values that underlie our
constitutional democracy as given expression by the provision of the Bill of
Rights.’63
In the same case, the court attempted to shed further light on the concept
of public policy and its role in the enforcement of contractual terms:
‘Notions of fairness, justice and equity, and reasonableness cannot be separated
from public policy. Public policy takes into account the necessity to do simple
justice between individuals. Public policy is informed by the concept of
ubuntu.’64
Thus in this case, which concerned a challenge to a time-bar clause in a
short-term insurance policy, the court weighed the term itself, as well as the
enforcement thereof, against public policy, informed by the right of access to
the courts.65 In this way, the Bill of Rights could be brought to bear on
contractual terms through the medium of the public policy rule.
The Constitutional Court then sets out a two-pronged test for testing for
the fairness of a contractual provision:
‘There are two questions to be asked in determining fairness. The first is
whether the clause itself is unreasonable. Secondly, if the clause is reasonable,
62 See the list of cases in note 13 above.
63 Barkhuizen supra note 13 paras 28–9.
64 Ibid para 51. ‘Ubuntu’ is anAfrican customary law notion which ‘emphasises the
communal nature of society and carries in it the ideas of humaneness, social justice
and fairness’. (Quoting a description from Everfresh supra note 13 para 71.) See fur-
ther: T W Bennett ‘Ubuntu: An African equity’ in Frank Diedrich (ed) Ubuntu, Good
Faith & Equity (2011) 3.
65 Section 34 of the Constitution of the Republic of SouthAfrica, 1996.
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whether it should be enforced in the light of the circumstances which
prevented compliance with the . . . clause.’66
The determination as to the validity or otherwise of contractual terms thus
extends the discretion of a judge beyond merely the remedial phase of a
contract.67 Thus, rather than holding that a contract is valid, but refusing
thereafter to specifically enforce it, a court may at the outset hold that a
contractual provision is contrary to public policy and hence unenforceable.
This would use the first prong of the test: namely whether the term of the
contract is valid per se. The second prong of the test, which relates to the
enforceability of a contractual provision implicates specific performance
directly. Thus specific performance may be denied where this would be
contrary to public policy. This second prong is wider than just that, however:
it could prevent the exercise of a power under a contract, since a court may
use its public policy discretion to fetter the exercise of that power.68 The
direct effect of the Barkhuizen decision is thus that a court has a broader
discretion to rule on the constitutional validity of contractual terms. Even if a
term passes constitutional manner on the face of it, the judicial discretion
extends into deciding whether a term may be specifically enforced or given
effect to in the light of constitutional-type policy considerations.
Following from this, it seems logical to assert that if a constitutionally
informed public policy is the major benchmark for an exercise of discretion
in specific performance claims, considerations of what may broadly be
termed ‘fairness’ would inform a decision as to whether to award the remedy
of specific performance. As we have seen above, this is not a massive shift
from the Benson decision, but it is easy to conclude that this element of
judicial discretion is now guided by constitutional values. Given the broad
carve out for judicial discretion to ensure fairness under the notion of public
policy set out in Barkhuizen above, it is possible that the discretion as to
whether or not to award specific performance has grown. Of course, more
traditional restrictions on the availability of specific performance may also
now be justified with reference to the Constitution. Thus, for example, the
right to freedom of expression may prevent a contractual undertaking to
apologise from being specifically enforceable.69 Likewise, the right to
66 Barkhuizen supra note 13 para 56.
67 Compare the argument of Lubbe op cit note 4, especially at 90 and 98–9.
68 Such as a restriction of a contractual right to cancel a contract, as in Botha supra
note 13 (discussed below). See generally Price & Hutchison op cit note 60.
69 For a South African discussion of apology as a remedy for a defamation suit in
South Africa, see C J Visser ‘The revival of the amende honorable as applied to
defamation by the media’ (2011) 128 SALJ 327 and Eric Descheemaeker ‘Old and
new learning in the law of amende honorable’ (2015) 132 SALJ 909. For an interest-
ing case where freedom of expression actually required specific performance of an
obligation to restore a billboard advert, see Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions SA v
Continental Outdoor Media (Pty) Ltd (2013/19700) Gauteng Local Division, Johannes-
burg (11 September 2014). With respect to theAustralian scenario, see Robyn Carroll
‘Apologies as a legal remedy’ (2013) 35 SLR 317; Robyn Carroll & Normann Wit-
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freedom of trade, occupation and profession,70 or the right to fair labour
practices,71 may prevent specific performance of a contract for personal
services.72
It may be argued that these types of cases were already established in the
first half of the twentieth century. One might further argue that these
grounds embody long-established principles of justice, or a ‘common-law
Bill of Rights’.73 The point, however, is that the doctrine of ‘fairness’ towards
which the Constitutional Court is groping represents a marked departure
from the views of the Supreme Court of Appeal in this regard. A judge may
today refuse to award specific performance of a contract where the conclu-
sion of terms, or even the preceding process of negotiation, was not in good
faith,74 or, as discussed above, where the terms themselves are contrary to
public policy.75
Conversely, if ‘fairness’ is to be an independent ground for intervening in
contractual relationships, the ambit of specific performance as a remedy may
be increased to allow enforcement of obligations arising outside of what was
in the past viewed as the contractual sphere. In Everfresh Market Virginia (Pty)
Ltd v Shoprite Checkers (Pty) Ltd the majority judgment of the Constitutional
Court stated in response to a call to enforce a duty to negotiate in good faith
clause contained in a so-called ‘agreement to agree’:
‘Were a court to entertain Everfresh’s argument, the underlying notion of good
faith in contract law, the maxim of contractual doctrine that agreements
seriously entered into should be enforced, and the value of ubuntu, which
inspires much of our constitutional compact, may tilt the argument in its favour.
Contracting parties certainly need to relate to each other in good faith. Where
there is a contractual obligation to negotiate, it would be hardly imaginable that
our constitutional values would not require that the negotiation must be done
reasonably, with a view to reaching an agreement and in good faith.’76
The minority judgment would have gone even further in enforcing the
clause: ‘If, for example, the High Court had found that the clause obliged
zleb ‘It’s not just about the money — Enhancing the vindicatory effect of private law
remedies’ (2011) 37 Monash University LR 216. See also Summertime Holdings Pty Ltd v
Environmental Defender’s Office Ltd [1998] 45 NSWLR 291.
70 Section 22 of the Constitution of the Republic of SouthAfrica, 1996.
71 Section 23.
72 For an interesting discussion of the issues involved from a South African per-
spective, see Tjakie Naudé ‘Specific performance against an employee: Santos Profes-
sional Football Club (Pty) Ltd v Igesund’ (2003) 120 SALJ 269. Further references to the
international case law and literature on this topic can be found therein.
73 For a discussion of the notion of a ‘common-law Bill of Rights’, albeit in a
different context, see Ettiene Mureinik ‘Administrative law in South Africa’ (1986)
103 SALJ 615; George Devenish Interpretation of Statutes (1992) 43–8. This scholar-
ship draws on Ronald Dworkin Taking Rights Seriously (1977).
74 Compare the argument of Friedmann op cit note 3 at 403–6, and 408–9.
75 Barkhuizen supra note 13 para 30; Lubbe op cit note 4 at 90.
76 Everfresh supra note 13 para 72.
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Shoprite to make at least one counter-offer, the obligation would not have
been too vague to be enforced.’77
In the light of Everfresh, a plaintiff may well seek specific performance of an
undertaking to negotiate contained in a preliminary agreement to agree. This
would certainly stretch the discretion of a judge beyond pre-established
boundaries and would require careful balancing with the notion of freedom
of contract, in the form of freedom not to contract. There is no doubt that an
order to negotiate would be difficult for a court to supervise, absent a
deadlock-breaking mechanism, such as an arbitration clause.78
In one of the most recent cases in point, Botha v Rich NO, ‘good faith’ was
used by the Constitutional Court to restrict the rights of a seller of land on
instalments to cancel for breach.79 Ms Botha had defaulted on her payments
under the contract of purchase, which had led to the purported cancellation
of the contract by the seller. Despite this purported cancellation, the
Constitutional Court held that Ms Botha was entitled to specific perfor-
mance of the seller’s obligation under the Alienation of Land Act80 to register
the property in her name, due to the fact that she had paid over half of the
purchase price. The exact effect of this case is open to a degree of
interpretation, but it could be read as limiting the availability of the remedy
of cancellation in the event of a breach of contract. If this purported
cancellation was overturned on constitutional or ‘good faith’ grounds, then
this would mean that specific performance of an obligation could be available
even where there had been a purported attempt to exercise a contractual
power to cancel for breach, on the grounds that a constitutionally developed
notion of fairness demands that the contract remain enforceable.
The Constitutional Court stated at the outset that
‘[t]he issue at stake entails the constitutionality of the enforcement of a
cancellation clause in a contract of a sale of immovable property in circum-
stances where more than half of the purchase price was paid and demand for
transfer of the property in terms of section 27(1) [of the Alienation of Land Act]
was refused by the seller’.81
It went on to find that
‘to deprive Ms Botha of the opportunity to have the property transferred to her
under section 27(1) and in the process cure her breach in regard to the arrears,
would be a disproportionate sanction in relation to the considerable portion of
the purchase price she has already paid and would thus be unfair’.82
77 Ibid para 35.
78 These issues are explored in detail in Andrew Hutchison ‘Agreements to agree:
Can there ever be an enforceable duty to negotiate in good faith’ (2011) 128 SALJ
273 and ‘Liability for breaking off contractual negotiations’ (2012) 129 SALJ 104.
79 Supra note 13.
80 Act 68 of 1981.
81 Botha supra note 13 para 23.
82 Ibid para 49.
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The court settled on awarding specific performance to Ms Botha of her rights
under the Act as interpreted, but balancing this against the rights of the seller
by ordering that Ms Botha pay her outstanding arrears and register a first
mortgage bond over the property in favour of the seller.83
In the same case, the Constitutional Court further clarified its view as to
the name to be given to this ‘fairness’ doctrine:
‘Bilateral contracts are almost invariably cooperative ventures where two
parties have reached a deal involving performances by each in order to benefit
both. Honouring that contract cannot therefore be a matter of each side pursuing
his or her own self-interest without regard to the other party’s interests. Good
faith is the lens through which we come to understand contracts in that way.’84
Viewed in the light of the above conception of this doctrine as one of
‘good faith’, which imposes duties of concern for the legitimate interests of
an opposing party, this must also inform the question as to the extent to
which judicial discretion may be exercised in awarding specific perfor-
mance.85 Beyond even the ordinary dictates of direct infringements of
constitutional rights, as per the examples listed above, the increasing scope of
good faith imposes duties on not only the parties in how they relate to each
other, but also on the judge of a contractual dispute, to ensure that fairness
inter partes is preserved. This means that the fifth ground stipulated in Haynes
for refusing to award specific performance, namely that an award of specific
performance should not operate unduly harshly on the defendant, will in
future predominate in claims for specific performance.86 The law as stated in
Benson regarding the plaintiff’s untrammelled right to specific performance
may thus be undercut by a need to ensure that hardship is not thereby
unfairly placed on the defendant, since enforcing a contract under these
circumstances would not be in good faith.
Furthermore, the grounds for exercising discretion in this type of case may
need to be crystallised to take account of the need in a precedent-based
system to treat like cases alike. It may well be, as Lubbe argues with reference
to the German law under § 138 and § 242 of the BGB, that typical cases of
denying or enforcing specific performance may arise.87 Our developing law
of good faith in contracting may then necessitate an expansion of these
grounds from those previously adopted from English law.
This article will now turn to a consideration of the comparative common
law on this topic, where the concept of discretion as a limiting factor to an
83 Ibid paras 49 and 53.
84 Ibid para 46. Compare Barkhuizen supra note 13 paras 79–82, where the ques-
tion as to the role of good faith in SouthAfrican contract law was left open.
85 Compare Lubbe op cit note 4 at 99. For an example of judicial discussion of the
necessity of taking into account a party’s legitimate interests in the context of perfor-
mance, see Mpange v Sithole 2007 (6) SA578 (W).
86 Haynes supra note 43 at 378H–379A(discussed above at part II(b)).
87 Lubbe op cit note 4 at 79 and 95–8. For further discussion of the so-called
‘Fallgruppen’ approach of German law in the context of § 242, see Whittaker &
Zimmermann op cit note 2.
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award of specific performance seems to be the most developed. If English law
has been South Africa’s guide and inspiration in this regard in the past, we
may today learn from the impact of the European HR regime on the English
doctrine of specific performance. Australian law is also relevant in this regard,
for a doctrine of contractual fairness and good faith in contracting is being
incrementally developed by the legislature and the courts, which can further
demonstrate the impact of increased equitable discretion for judges on the
remedies available for breach of contract.
(b) The English and Australian landscape: specific performance, human rights, good
faith, and fairness
Given what we have discussed above, it seems to us that the key concept
which characterises the current development of the doctrine of specific
performance in South African contract law is that of ‘fairness’. Furthermore,
it is our suggestion that contractual fairness is also increasingly becoming the
standpoint from which the courts commence their legal reasoning in order to
determine whether specific performance may be granted or not in the
English and Australian legal systems. Yet, as we aim to demonstrate, this
common trend towards contractual fairness is characterised by a clear
divergence of positivist methodologies. We refer particularly to the nature
(and hierarchical attitude) of the legal sources used in this process: the
Constitution in South Africa; the equitable tradition and European HR
regime in the UK; and the equitable tradition in Australia.
The importance of gaining a full understanding of how the three legal systems
under investigation differ is, we believe, related to the fact that, although the
essence of specific performance as an equitable remedy has long been investigat-
ed,88 the reason for this dichotomy between the civil (or Roman-Dutch) law
and the common law lies in the different role that good faith plays within these
legal traditions, rather than in the pacta sunt servanda doctrine.
Common-law systems have a soft approach to good faith, which is
understood more as an underlying principle (or implied duty) than a rule of
law. On the contrary, in civil-law countries the parties to a contract are
explicitly required to act in good faith in all phases of their contractual
relationship.89 In particular, this legal duty is rooted in the anthropological
88 Gareth Jones & William Goodhart Specific Perfomance 2 ed (1986); Robert J
Sharpe Injunctions and Specific Performance 2 ed (1992); Edward Yorio Contract Enforce-
ment: Specific Performance and Injunctions (1989); Sir Jack Beatson Anson’s Law of Con-
tract 28 ed (2002) 632–41; Donald Harris, David Campbell & Roger Halson Remedies
in Contract & Tort 2 ed (2002) 166–97; Sarah Worthington Equity 2 ed (2006); Spry op
cit note 23 at 51–321; Mindy Chen-Wishart Contract Law (2012) 537–66; Ewan
McKendrick Contract Law 10 ed (2013) 372; Denis S K Ong Specific Performance
(2013); Katy Barnett & Sirko Harder Remedies in Australian Private Law (2014) 230–
56.
89 For an investigation on why and how Fides, the white-haired goddess, became
secularised in Roman contract law theory and practice, see Alain Supiot Homo Juridi-
cus. On the Anthropological Function of the Law (tr Saskia Brown [2005] 2007) 90–4. It
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understanding of the contract’s ‘civilising mission’,90 and requires that the
party takes into account the other party’s legitimate interests and rights at all
contracting stages.91
If we adopt an unconventional approach to this dichotomy with the aim of
identifying its essential features, it emerges that it is precisely the essence of
good faith as an obligation to take care of the other party’s specific (rather than
monetary and thus neutral) interests and rights that led the civilian ‘scientific’
approach to law to promote the notion of specific performance as a right
rather than as an exceptional remedy subjected to the discretion of the courts.
The principle pacta sunt servanda encompasses every aspect of the agree-
ment, including the duty to act specifically in good faith, and thus, to perform
specifically (either spontaneously or because of the court’s order) according
to the other party’s rights as written down in the contract. Considering the
essence of the process through which we place faith in someone as
unconditional abandonment to the power of the other, the understanding of
specific performance as a right makes sense only in civil-law countries,
because it is only in these legal systems that there is an a priori (and specifically
enforceable92) duty to act in good faith — that is to take into consideration
the other party’s specific needs and privileges. In other words, it is precisely the
structure and function of the parties’ ex ante specific duty to act with bona
fides that leads to an ex post right to claim for specific performance in case of
breach of contract. Kant’s ontology of duty93 has clearly influenced this
approach and makes it evident that in civil-law systems specific performance
is theoretically understood as a powerful device to be used in order to achieve
the contractual balance that was threatened by the breach of contract.
Importantly, our suggestions are confirmed by the essence of the liability
rule in which damages are rooted. As Kronman has indeed correctly noted,
‘[i]n contract law, a liability rule permits a promisor to breach his promise
was 1861 and 1906 when Rudolf von Jhering and Gabriele Fagella demonstrated the
importance of having a strong approach to bona fides and culpa in contrahendo. In
particular, Fagella showed the importance of distinguishing three different periods of
good faith (the period before any offer has been drafted; the period during which an
offer is drafted; the period when the offer has been made). See, respectively, Culpa in
contrahendo: oder Schadensersatz bei nichtigen oder nicht zur Perfection gelangten Verträgen,
IV (1860); Dei Periodi Precontrattuali e della loro vera ed esatta costruzione scientifica, in
Studi Giuridici in Onore di Carlo Fadda, III (1906) 271. The value of Fagella’s theory
was recognised by Raymond Saleilles in ‘De la responsabilité précontractuelle; à
propos d’une etude nouvelle sur la matière’ (1907) RTD civ 697. The Italian Civil
Code of 1942 was the first in Europe to contain a specific provision on pre-
contractual good faith (art 1337). For a comparative glance on good faith see Hugh
Beale, Bénédicte Fauvarque-Cosson, Jacobien Rutgers, Denis Tallon & Stefan Voge-
nauer Cases, Materials and Text on Contract Law (2010) 371–426.
90 Siliquini-Cinelli op cit note 18; Supiot op cit note 89.
91 Muro Bianca Il Contratto (1987) 500–10.
92 Compare, for instance, art 1338 of the Italian Civil Code.
93 Giorgio Agamben Opus Dei. An Archaeology of Duty (Adam Kotzotr, 2013)
(2012) 89-13.
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provided he compensates the other party by payment of money damages’.94
Paraphrasing Kronman’s account, we may argue that specific performance
does not allow such a breach because it forces the defendant to perform what
was promised in the contract. This is why, in Lord Selborne LC’s words,
‘specific performance presupposes an executory as distinct from an executed
agreement, something remaining to be done . . . in order to put the parties in
the position relative to each other in which by the preliminary agreement
they were intended to be placed’.95
Conversely, the fact that the ex ante duty to act in good faith is understood
in terms of a mere soft duty (or underlying principle) within the common-
law tradition makes it evident that in the legal systems which adopt it, the ex
post order to perform (and thus to take care of the plaintiff’s interests and
rights in specie) cannot be anything but exceptional, and damages are usually
preferred.96
That said, it is evident that within the common-law tradition specific
performance can also only be claimed if a contract exists which is enforceable
at law. Yet the notion of ‘enforceable’ is an extensive one, and there have
been cases in which the courts have ordered specific performance in the
absence of an enforceable contract.97 However, the orthodox statement
about the role of specific performance is that, given its equitable essence, it
will not be granted when damages offer a relatively adequate remedy for the
protection of the creditor’s rights and interests.98 This means that, as Lord
Redesdale said, specific performance will not be ordered should damages
fully compensate and be able to put the creditor in a position ‘as beneficial to
him as if the agreement were specifically performed’.99
94 Anthony T Kronman ‘Specific performance’ (1978) 45 University of Chicago LR
351 at 352. For an investigation on the multi-faceted structure of the comparative law
and economics method, see Francesco Parisi & Barbara Luppi ‘Quantitative methods
in comparative law’ in Monateri (ed) op cit note 28 at 306–16; Francesco Parisi &
Barbara Luppi ‘Comparative law and economics: Accounting for social norms’ in
David S Clark (ed) Comparative Law and Society (2012) 92–104; Vincy Fon &
Francesco Parisi ‘Litigation and the evolution of legal remedies: A dynamic model’
(2003) 116 Public Choice 414. See also Fransceco Parisi & Vincy Fon The Economics of
Law Making (2009).
95 Wolverhampton and Walsall Railway Company v London and North-Western Railway
Company (1873) LR 16 Eq Cas 433 at 439.
96 This comparative perspective explains the preference of the World Trade
Organisation for the common-law approach to business as expressed by Beck and
Levine’s law and finance neutral (that is, mechanic and dehumanised) approach. The
rule that specific performance will not be granted in favour of a plaintiff whose claim
is simply for the payment of money confirms this suggestion. See Turner v Bladin
(1951) 82 CLR 463.
97 Spry op cit note 23 at 52.
98 Harnett v Yelding (1805) 2 Sch & Lef 549; Johnson v Agnew [1980] AC 367 at
400–1.
99 Harnett v Yelding ibid at 553. See also South African Territories Ltd v Wallington
[1989] AC 309. In the words of Alan Schwartz, ‘[s]pecific performance is the most
accurate method of achieving the compensation goal of contract remedies because it
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The limit of such an understanding of specific performance emerged in a
series of cases.100 As Spry notes, the current tendency of common-law judges
is to ask ‘as the ultimate question whether it would be more just to grant
specific performance than to award damages’.101 Hence, should damages be
inadequate, the court’s discretion may nevertheless lead to a refusal of specific
performance. On the other hand, since land is a unique property with a
determined value, damages are usually considered to be an inadequate
remedy for the breach of a contract for its sale102 or occupancy.103
As in South Africa, the decision to grant specific performance in the
common-law jurisdictions is therefore never automatic or neutral: it always
implies a significant decree of discretion, which is historically rooted in the
origins of the equitable remedies as discussed above.104 The legal reasoning
which lies behind the drafting of s 52(1) of the English Sale of Goods Act,
1979105 is testament to this.
In making his or her decision, the equitable judge always takes into
consideration factors which would be ignored by a common-law judge.106 In
trying to offer a better understanding of the ratio decidendi which may lead
to a grant or refusal of the order, it was argued that ‘specific performance is
best understood by reference to the factors that weigh against the remedy’.107
This claim served to pave the way for a roadmap that divided these factors
into three categories: claimant-sided considerations, defendant-sided consid-
erations, and administrative considerations. In particular, it clearly emerges
from the case law that specific performance will not be granted when the
contract is the result of mistake, misrepresentation, or unfairness.108
In addition, a court also considers factors which arose after the finalisation
of the agreement (such as, impossibility of the performance, unsuitability of
gives the promise the precise performance that he purchased’. See Alan Schwartz
‘The case of specific performance’ (1979) Yale LJ 271 at 274.
100 Tito v Waddell (No 2) [1977] Ch 106. See also Beswick v Beswick [1968] AC 58 at
77, 83 and 88, where it was stated that a specific performance should be ordered if it
would ‘do more perfect and complete justice’, but that a contract in favour of a
third-party beneficiary may be enforced by specific performance.
101 Spry op cit note 23 at 60.
102 Hasham v Zenab [1960]AC 316.
103 Verrall v Great Yarmouth Borough Council [1981] QB 202.
104 See part I.
105 According to which, ‘[i]n any action for breach of contract to deliver specific or
ascertained goods the court may, if it thinks fit, on the plaintiff’s application, by its
judgment or decree direct that the contract shall be performed specifically, without
giving the defendant the option of retaining the goods on payment of damages’.
Compare also s 48A–48E in Part 5A, which allow specific performance to be ordered
to compel the (commercial) seller to repair or replace non-conforming goods. See
Spry op cit note 23 at 289–321.
106 Ex pluribus, see the recent McLeary v Swift [2014] NSWSC 870; Galafassi v Kelly
[2014] NSWCA190; Mohareb v Jankulovski [2014] NSWSC 745.
107 Chen-Wishart op cit note 88 at 540.
108 Leading cases are Manser v Beck (1848) 6 Hare 443 at 448, Tamplin v James (1880)
15 Ch D 215, and Wedgwood v Adams (1843) 6 Beav 600.
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the obligation, hardship, mutuality, insolvency, a prior breach of contract
committed by the claiming party), and other practical evaluative criteria
(such as supervision by the court, or avoiding multiple suits) to determine
whether the specific performance option is practical or not.109 By way of an
example, in the recent Wright Prospecting Pty Ltd v Hancock Prospecting Pty
Ltd,110 a delicate case on a property purchase option arising from a
commercial partnership, the defendant was ordered to execute the deed of
assignment within a specified time and that, if it were to fail to do so, the
registrar of the court would be authorised to execute it.
Other elements are considered as well. In particular, given the aim of this
study, it is worth mentioning that the proximity of the pacta sunt servanda
doctrine111 would lead a court not to grant the order to perform should the
contract prescribe differently for the event of its breach. Yet a belief in the
absolute freedom of contractual relationships has been abandoned by legal
discourse since the beginning of the twentieth century, when legal scholars
started realising that only under conditions of perfect competition and
without asymmetric information would individuals not exert undue influ-
ence over others. Hence, the court of equity has developed an important test
to determine whether such a reductionist clause ‘constitute[s] a genuine
attempt to pre-estimate the loss expected to result from the breach in
question,’112 and is thus admissible. The same approach is followed in other
jurisdictions as well. In the US, for instance, the judicial unwillingness to
honour contractual provisions which allow a private abuse of an equitable
remedy was affirmed in the well-known case of Stokes v Moore.113
It is of pivotal interest that the court will not grant specific performance
should this be interpreted as a way to put intolerable limitations on personal
liberty — something which, of course, cannot be legally or morally accepted.
This method of decision-making is anything but surprising and may be fully
understood only through the lenses of the Human RightsAct, 1998 (‘HRA’),
the ultimate instrument through which the UK ‘has moved from liberties to
rights’.114
109 A comprehensive list of cases may be found in Spry op cit note 23 at 89–244;
Beatson op cit note 88, at 634–7; Harris, Campbell & Halson op cit note 88 at
178–93; Chen-Wishart op cit note 88 at 537–66.
110 [2014] WASC 149.
111 On the ‘civilising mission’of this doctrine, see Supiot op cit note 89 at 78–109.
112 Harris, Campbell & Halson op cit note 88 at 195.
113 262Ala 59, 77 So 2d 331 (1995).
114 R Costigan & P A Thomas ‘The Human Rights Act: A view from below’ in
Luke Clements & Philip AThomas (eds) Human Rights Act: A Success Story? (2005) 51
at 51. Scholarship on the Human Rights Act is literally endless. For an introduction,
see Nicholas Kang-Riou (ed) Confronting the Human Rights Act 1998: Contemporary
Themes and Perspectives (2013); John Cartwright op cit note 22 at 29–30; Lord Irvine
of Lairg Human Rights, Constitutional Law and the Development of the English Legal
System (2003); Frances Butler (ed) Human Rights Protection: Methods and Effectiveness
(2002); Anthony Bradney ‘Another legal revolution’ (2002) 15 The JBS Journal 14;
Jonathan Cooper & Adrian Marshall-Williams (eds) Legislating for Human Rights. The
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Notably, the aim of the HRA is to incorporate the European Convention
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 1950
(‘ECHR’) by rendering Convention rights enforceable before domestic
courts. In particular, as the Introduction to the HRA states, the HRA gives
further effect to the rights and freedoms guaranteed under the Convention’s
regime. From the contract-law perspective, relevant articles are all those that
regulate the (peaceful enjoyment of) possession of goods (art of Protocol 1),
the right to respect for a person’s home and private/family life (art 8(1)), the
right to freedom of association (art 11), and the right to protection against any
possible form of discrimination (art 14).
In addition, while art 4(2) of the EHCR states that ‘no one shall be
required to perform forced or compulsory labour’, according to art 6(1) of
the HRA ‘it is unlawful for a public authority to act in a way which is
incompatible with a Convention right’. This means that, the UK court being
a public authority, its duty to act consistently with the Convention rights will
lead it to refuse to order specific performance every time a different decision
is seen as a breach of the ECHR.
In this sense, one of the major difficulties that the contract-law interpreter
faces whilst assigning a role to specific performance within the new legislative
scenario is to determine to what extent the EU HR regime impacts on
domestic contract law, and how the courts should effectively deal with it.
Indeed, while the literal interpretation of the relevant norms and case law
suggest that the UK courts will rarely use their power to undermine domestic
contract-law regulation and the freedom to bargain that they express,115 it
was argued that, ‘[i]f it is likely that the claimant will win in Strasbourg, the
courts are more likely to anticipate the predicted outcome even though it has
not yet happened’.116 The latter suggestion, however, not only stands against
the original intention which led to the drafting of the HRA,117 but is also
inconsistent with Parliament’s unwillingness for UK judges merely to follow
the European supra-national dicta.118
(i) Australia’s weak approach to equal treatment
It is precisely because of what was analysed thus far that the Australian
landscape may shed some light for the South African contract lawyer. As in
South Africa, where the Constitution increasingly plays a pivotal role at all
stages of contracting, even without express mention of a value of contractual
fairness, in Australia conceptions of contractual fairness and good faith are
also slowly, yet efficiently, filling the gap left by weak constitutional
Parliamentary Debates on the Human Rights Bill (2000); Francesca Klug ‘The Human
RightsAct 1998, Pepper v Hart and all that’1999 Public Law Review 246.
115 Cf s 2(1)–(2) HRA. See Wilson v First County Trust Ltd (No 2) [2003] UKHL 40.
116 Brenda Hale ‘High points and low points in the first ten years’ in Kang-Riou
(ed) op cit note 114 at 54.
117 Francesca Kulg & Helen Wildbore ‘Follow or lead? The Human Rights Act and
the European Court of Human Rights’ (2010) 6 European Human Rights LR 621.
118 Hansard (HL Debates), 3 November 1997, col 1245.
(2016) 133 THE SOUTH AFRICAN LAW JOURNAL94
equal-treatment provisions. This trend confirms that Dawson J was right
when he claimed that the founding fathers of modern Australia had
deliberately left the administration and protection of individual rights to the
courts and Parliament.119
This is clearly demonstrated by the fact that while Australian contract law
gives to specific performance the analogous exceptional role that it plays in
English law by subjecting it to similar limitations,120 Australia does not have a
European HR regime, nor does its democratic Constitution have a Bill of
Rights upon which a court may ‘hook’ any possible judicial refusal to grant
equitable remedies. More precisely, the Australian Constitution contains just
a few express guarantees of fundamental rights from legislative power.121 In
addition, the notorious circumstances that Australian federal law has ‘weak’
equal treatment provisions122 and that, as Gaudron J has noted, ‘until 1967,
the Constitution, itself, was blatantly discriminatory’,123 make it evident that
the power of the Australian judge to decide whether or not to grant specific
performance may reach levels of discretion which are unknown within
English law.
In this regard, it is worth mentioning that, although Australia has ratified
both the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, their
content is enforceable under domestic law only to the extent that they have
been incorporated by legislation.124
119 Kruger v Commonwealth (Stole Generation Case) (1997) 190 CLR 1 at 61.
120 See, for instance, ss 53, 58, 51, 51, 56, 55 and 56 of the Sale of Goods Act of,
respectively, Queensland, Victoria, South Australia, Western Australia, Australian
National Territory, and Northern Territory (there is no equivalent provision in New
South Wales). For an introduction, see Lindy Willmott, Sharon Christensen, Des
Butler & Bill Dixon Contract Law 4 ed (2014) 267–88; N C Seddon, R A Bigwood &
M P Ellinghaus Cheshire and Fifoot Law of Contract 10 ed (2012) 54 and 1179–1204:
Jeannie Paterson, Andrew Robertson & Arlen Duke Principles of Contract Law 4 ed
(2012) 561–72; John W Carter Cases and Materials on Contract Law in Australia 6 ed
(2012) 1001–13; Philip Clarke & Julie Clarke Contract Law. Commentaries, Cases and
Perspectives 2 ed (2012) 702–21; Dilan Thampapillai, Vivi Tan & Claudio Bozzi Con-
tract Law Text and Cases (2012) 549–58; Andrew Burrows A Casebook on Contract 3 ed
(2011) 462–77; Daniel Khoury & Yvonne Yamouni Understanding Contract Law 8 ed
(2010) 463–6; Stephen Graw An Introduction to the Law of Contract 4 ed (2002) 422–6.
By way of an example, Co-operative Insurance Society Ltd v Argyll Stores (Holdings) Ltd
[1998] AC 1, a leading case which shows the House of Lords’ reluctance to expand
the availability of the specific remedy within contract law, is still good law.
121 Commonwealth ofAustralia ConstitutionAct 1900, ss 51(xxxi), 80 and 116.
122 Such as ss 25, 51(i)–(ii), 88, 92, 117.
123 Kruger v Commonwealth supra note 119 at 112, while describing the former s 127
of the Constitution.
124 Chow Hung Ching v The King (1948) 77 CLR 449; Dietrich v The Queen (1992)
177 CLR 292; Kioa v West (1985) 159 CLR 550. Examples are the Racial Discrimi-
nation Act 1975 (Cth), the Sex Discrimination Act 1984 (Cth), and the Human
Rights (Sexual Conduct)Act 1994 (Cth).
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Attempts to achieve a comprehensive, federal legal protection of human
rights and fundamental freedoms have not yet succeeded, although they date
back to the first Australasian Federal Convention in 1891.125 The Australian
Capital Territory and the state of Victoria are the only Australian jurisdictions
to have enacted a charter or bill of rights to date.126 Importantly, the
‘weakness’ of Australia’s approach to the HR doctrine and equal treatment
policies is well demonstrated by the essence of the powers granted to the
Australia Commission on Human Rights.127 More precisely, although the
Commission has the power to supervise the compliance with equal-
treatment dispositions, it can neither sanction the discriminatory conduct
brought to its attention, nor can it back up its compliance notices to
organisations that are not following the law with a court order.128 Impor-
tantly, the Commission cannot take to court an organisation that breaks an
agreement made with it regarding what they are required to do to make sure
that they are complying with the law.129
That having being said, given that Australia is a system of common law in
which ‘everybody is free to do anything, subject only to the provisions of the
law’,130 for present purposes it should be noted that the recent intention of
the current Attorney-General, Senator the Hon George Brandis QC, ‘to
review Commonwealth legislation to identify provisions that unreasonably
encroach upon traditional rights, freedoms and privileges’131 has caused
general dismay. In a legal system in which there is the clear necessity of (and
opportunity for) having a consistent federal approach to equal treatment in
terms of a rule of law,132 and in which the Constitution does not create
125 Amongst others, see J Else-Mitchell (ed) Essays on the Australian Constitution 2 ed
(1961); John A Nauze The Making of the Australian Constitution (1972); Richard D
Lumb Australian Constitutionalism (1983).
126 Respectively, Human Rights Act 2004 and Equal Opportunities Act 2010. See
also the Charter of Human Rights and ResponsibilitiesAct 2006 (Vic).
127 Australian Human Rights CommissionAct 1986 (Cth).
128 Conversely, in the UK, a failure to comply with the Equality and Human Rights
Commission’s notice is a criminal offence.
129 A series of possible alternative schemes for enforcing Australia’s anti-
discrimination laws with a particular focus on the role of the equal opportunity
agencies were discussed at the seminar given by Dr Dominique Allen entitled ‘A new
regulatory model for enforcing anti-discrimination law’ Thursday 14 August 2014,
School of Law, Faculty of Business & Law, Deakin University.




132 The need for a major procedural and substantial reconsideration of Australia’s
normative regulation of human rights issues was at the centre of the recent campaign
‘Invisible Discriminator’. More details may be found at https://www.humanrights.
gov.au/news/stories/commission-commends-invisible-discriminator-campaign, accessed on
15August 2014.
(2016) 133 THE SOUTH AFRICAN LAW JOURNAL96
private rights enforceable by an action for damages,133 any political interven-
tion which is aimed at broadening the (liberal134) notion of what is permitted
by law may represent a threat to the results that have been achieved thus
far.135
(ii) Contractual fairness and good faith as substitutes of constitutional equal treatment
in Australia
In the light of the foregoing, the fact that Australian law is developing, not
without difficulties and contradictions, an implied duty of good faith in
contracting136 is anything but surprising and may be seen as a way to promote
within contract law theory and practice the notion of equal treatment which
is not provided by constitutional provisions. Indeed, although the Australian
High Court is yet to endorse the implied term of good faith and socio-legal
scholars are debating about the basis for its implication at law137 (and, thus,
whether it should be implied in commercial contracts138), several indicia
support this view.
133 Kruger v The Commonwealth supra note 119 at 46–7; British American Tobacco
Australia Ltd v Western Australia (2003) 217 CLR 30.
134 Paul W Kahn Putting Liberalism in its Place (2008).
135 The essence of this threat was discussed during the seminar given by Professor
Simon Rice and entitled ‘Race, civility and the changes to the Racial Discrimination
Act’, Wednesday 30 July 2014, School of Law, Faculty of Business & Law, Deakin
University.
136 See E McKendrick & Q Liu Contract Law. Australian Edition (2015) 69–70 and
271–7; Geoff Lindday Contract 7 ed (2014) 154–8; Willmott et al op cit note 120;
Seddon, Bigwood & Ellinghaus op cit note 120 at 461–79; Paterson, Robertson &
Duke op cit note 120 at 341–9; Carter op cit note 120 at 29–46; Clarke & Clarke op
cit note 120 at 101; Thampapillai, Tan & Bozzi op cit note 120 at 231–6; Burrows op
cit note 120 at 71–5; Graw op cit note 120 at 77–9. Unfortunately, the scope of this
comparative investigation does not allow us to deal with the development of the
doctrine of good faith in employment, insurance, and consumer contracts inAustralia
— the analysis of which would deserve an entire article. It is however noteworthy
that in the recent Bhasin v Hrynew case the Canadian Supreme Court held that good
faith is a general organising principle of the common law of contract in Canada. In
particular, through a unanimous judgement, the Court stated that good faith is a
‘general organising principle’ of Canadian contract law, and that as far as general duties
are concerned, this implies not a particular duty of loyalty or disclosure, but a general
obligation to act with ‘honesty’. See Bhasin v Hrynew [2014] SCC 71 paras 33, 63,
73–4 and 86.
137 For an introduction, see James Allsop ‘Good faith and Australian contract law: A
practical issue and a question of theory and principle’ (2011) 85 Australian LJ 341;
Elisabeth Peden ‘Contractual good faith: Can Australia benefit from the American
experience’ (2003) 15 Bond LR 186; John W Carter & Elisabeth Peden ‘A good faith
perspective on liquidated damages’ (2007) 23 Journal of Contract Law 157; John W
Carter & Elisabeth Peden ‘Good faith in Australian contract law’ (2003) 19 Journal of
Contract Law 155.
138 Elisabeth Peden ‘Implicit good faith — Or do we still need an implied term of
good faith?’ (2009) 25 Journal of Contract Law 50; Elisabeth Peden ‘When common
law trumps equity: The rise of good faith and reasonableness and the demise of
unconscionability’ (2005) 21 Journal of Contract Law 226; Elisabeth Peden ‘The mis-
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By way of an example, although there is as of yet no clear statement from
the courts or legal scholars as to what the implied duty of good faith
requires,139 a general duty to co-operate reasonably140 is well established in
Australian contract law.141
Whilst trying to provide the interpreter with a clear definition of this duty,
in Vermeulen v SIMU Mutual Insurance Association142 it was stated that the
parties have to perform their obligation(s) with scrupulous fairness and
honesty. Since then, community standards of decency and fair dealing are
taken into account in order to determine whether the party’s behaviour was
legal or not.143 The duty to act with bona fides applies to both pre-
contractual negotiations and post-contractual obligations, as well as to the
method through which a claim is made and then handled.144
In the well-known cases of Dowsett v Reid and Norton v Angus145 it clearly
emerged that whilst promoting this policy of contractual fairness with the
intent to achieve an effective balance of opposite interests as a substitute for
weak constitutional equal-treatment provisions, the courts will never grant
specific performance should the order cause hardship to the defendant that
would not be caused by an award of damages. Spry summarises this line of
legal reasoning whilst highlighting that specific performance will be refused
any time that ‘the actual consequences of enforcement would operate so
harshly and oppressively towards the defendant that the grant of relief would
be unjust in all the circumstance’.146 Importantly, in order to achieve
take of looking for legislative influence in contractual good faith’ (2002) 16 Commer-
cial Law Quarterly 20; Elisabeth Peden Good Faith in the Performance of Contract (2003);
Elisabeth Peden ‘The meaning of contractual good faith’ (2002) 22 Australian Bar
Review 235; Howard Munro ‘The ‘‘good faith’’ controversy in Australian commercial
law: A survey of the spectrum of academic legal opinion’ (2009) 28 The University of
Queensland LJ 167.
139 Esso Australia Resources Pty Ltd v Southern Pacific Petroleum NL [2005] VSCA228.
140 Secured Income Real Estate (Australia) Ltd v St Martins Investments Pty Ltd (1979)
144 CLR 596; Alcatel Australia Ltd v Scarcella (1998) 44 NSWLR 349; Howtrac Rentals
Pty Ltd v Thiess Contractors (NZ) Limited [2000] VSC 415.
141 Secured Income Real Estate (Australia) Ltd v St Martins Investments Pty Ltd ibid at
607. See also Renard Constructions (ME) Pty Ltd v Minister for Public Works (1992) 26
NSWLR 234; Hughes Aircraft Systems International Pty Ltd v Airservices Australia (1997)
76 FCR 151.
142 (1987) 4ANZ Ins Cas 60-821 at 74.
143 Kenneth Sutton Insurance Law in Australia 3 ed (1991) 158.
144 CGU Insurance Ltd v AMO Financial Planning Pty Ltd (2007) 235 CLR 1, [2007]
HCA 36; Distillers Co Biochemicals (Australia) Pty Ltd v Ajax Insurance Co Ltd (1974)
130 CLR 1; Imagining Applications Pty Ltd v Vero Insurance Ltd [2008] VSC 178.
145 Respectively, (1912) 15 HCA75 and (1926) HCA35.
146 Spry op cit note 23 at 196. Such a hypothetical situation is, in part, similar to that
in which the order to perform would result unfair in light of considerations ante
factum, such as when the conduct of the plaintiff renders it unfair for the courts to
require the defendant to carry out his/her obligations, and thus for specific perfor-
mance to be granted. For possible examples like undue influence, unconscionable
dealing and misrepresentation, see Blomley v Ryan (1956) 99 CLR 362; Commercial
Bank of Australia v Amadio (1983) 151 CLR 447; Louth v Diprose (1992) 175 CLR 621.
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contractual fairness and balance between the opposite interests of the parties,
the courts will weigh any possible hardship to the defendant against the
possible hardship that would be caused to the plaintiff should specific
performance not be granted.147 Surprisingly, the reasoning which lies behind
such a refusal is substantially similar to that that led to the drafting of the
aforementioned art 4(2) of the EHCR, which is applied in English law
through art 6(1) of the HRA, and which is aimed at avoiding any oppressive,
and thus unjust, use of legal remedies. This clearly emerges from one of the
leading cases on the remedies available for breach of contract, Giumelli v
Giumelli.148 Indeed, on that occasion it was established that specific relief will
not be awarded every time should it be unconscionable or unjust to the
estopped party or even third parties.
With the similar intent to move towards a comprehensive promotion of
contractual fairness and equal treatment, in Bahr v Nicolay (No 2)149 it was
stated that it is inappropriate to decree specific performance in favour of a
plaintiff who is unable or unwilling to perform an essential term arising from
the contract.150 The legal reasoning which led to this powerful decision is
rooted in what was previously stated in another leading case, namely that,
whilst considering the opportunity for granting specific performance, the
courts will always take into account whether the plaintiff is ready to fulfil all of
his or her obligations.151
IV CONCLUSION
This contribution has attempted an understanding of contract law theory and
practice in the light of constitutional law developments. A full treatment of
the relationship between contract and constitutional law would, of course,
require an extended attention, certainly more than can be provided here.
Thus, we have focused our efforts on three main components of the contract
law dimension: good faith, contractual fairness, and specific performance.
More precisely, in trying to offer a solid justification for our argument on
the necessity of analysing the development of contract law rules and practices
through the lens of constitutional-law issues, we have argued that (1) the
understanding of specific performance as a right makes sense only in civil-law
countries because it is only in these legal systems that there is an a priori (and
specifically enforceable) duty to act in good faith — that is to take into
consideration the other party’s specific needs and privileges; (2) the key
147 Easts v Russ [1914] 1 Ch 468 at 480. If the hardship which would be suffered by
the defendant should specific performance take place would be much greater than the
detriment that would be suffered by the plaintiff, the latter will be forced to accept
monetary compensation. See Coles Supermarket Aust Pty Ltd v Australian Retail Free-
holds Pty Ltd (1996) 16 WAR 282.
148 [1999] HCA10, (1999) 196 CLR 1010 [34]–[50].
149 (1988) 164 CLR 604.
150 Should the term be inessential, the court may still discretionally refuse to grant
the order. See Green v Sommerville (1979) 141 CLR 594.
151 Mehmet v Benson (1965) 113 CLR 295.
CONSTITUTIONALISM, GOOD FAITH AND SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE 99
element which characterises the current progression of the doctrine of
specific performance in South African, English, and Australian contract law is
that of ‘fairness’.
With respect to the latter point, it is our suggestion that contractual fairness
is increasingly becoming, in all these three legal systems, the standpoint from
which the courts commence their legal reasoning in order to determine
whether specific performance may be granted or not. This is so, we argue,
because of the intrinsic essence of every specific remedy, which is to give to
the creditor the opportunity to make the court coerce the debtor into
performing or not performing a certain contractual obligation.
Yet, despite this common feature, this evolutionary process is taking place
in three different ways. Although in South Africa specific performance is
today considered as the primary remedy for breach of contract, the
unavoidable and increasing relevance of good faith in contract law theory
and practice means nothing more than that the court dealing with a
contractual dispute must make sure that the outcome of the judgment will
preserve the fairness which characterised the (no longer operative) contrac-
tual relationship. In this sense, it seems reasonable to argue that the
pre-eminence of the 1996 Constitution and its Bill of Rights does not leave
any choice to the South African judge but to infer the content of
(contractual) fairness in accordance with what is argued in the more recent
Constitutional Court cases. If this reasoning is correct, it becomes evident
that the question whether or not the court would grant an order to perform
specifically in the light of the contractual agreement is one that cannot be
answered without an analysis of the very notion of contractual good faith as it
emerges, for instance, from the Botha v Rich NO case. Put bluntly, this means
that, although in South Africa (as in civil-law countries) specific performance
is theoretically (and historically) conceived of as a right freely enforceable by
the creditor for his or her own satisfaction, its actual awarding is subject to a
degree of judicial discretion which cannot be understood without an a priori
understanding of why the Constitution is increasingly becoming a protago-
nist in all stages of contracting, from negotiation to enforcement.
By contrast, in English and Australian law priority is given to the remedy
of damages in the light of the historical and philosophical reasons investigated
in part II of our study. As we mentioned, in these legal systems specific
performance is an exceptional remedy whose origins are rooted in the
equitable jurisdiction of the Court of Chancery. Given the coercive nature of
any specific remedy, several factors are considered by the courts whilst
deciding whether to ‘force’ the debtor to specifically perform, and thus fulfil
his/her contractual obligations, or not. For present purposes, what is relevant
is that the UK has adopted, with the HRA, the European HR regime. HR
policies are therefore always taken into account in the decision-making
process with the aim of evaluating whether the order to perform would
eventually result in a breach of the ECHR. It is therefore evident that such
a decision would then in turn shed some light on the original fairness of
the contractual obligation as well, because the court will not allow the
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a posteriori performance of a contractual activity which puts intolerable
limitations on personal (legal) liberty. In sum, this means that, through the
European HR filter, English law may indirectly achieve the regime of
contractual fairness (and good faith) which common-law systems usually
lack.
Australia’s democratic Constitution has extremely weak equal-treatment
provisions and lacks a federal Bill of Rights — the Australian Capital
Territory and the state of Victoria being the only Australian jurisdictions to
have enacted charters of this kind. This means that it is only within English
law that the order to perform (as taking care of the other party’s needs) may
be refused on the ground of mandatory equal-treatment evaluations. In this
sense, the need to fill the gap voluntarily left by its founding fathers through
contract law rules is, in our opinion, the reason why Australia is moving
towards an implied duty of good faith to promote contractual fairness, in
clear opposition to the very essence of the common-law tradition.
If this, as we think, is correct, it means that the geopolitical divide between
civil-law, common-law, and mixed legal systems is weaker than many often
think.
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